From f58bab6fd4063913bd8321e99874b8239e9ba726 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 14:47:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 01/19] nfsd: ensure that nfsd4_fattr_args.context is zeroed out If nfsd4_encode_fattr4 ends up doing a "goto out" before we get to checking for the security label, then args.context will be set to uninitialized junk on the stack, which we'll then try to free. Initialize it early. Fixes: f59388a579c6 ("NFSD: Add nfsd4_encode_fattr4_sec_label()") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 42b41d55d4ed..43ccf6119cf1 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3545,6 +3545,9 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr4(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, args.dentry = dentry; args.ignore_crossmnt = (ignore_crossmnt != 0); args.acl = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL + args.context = NULL; +#endif /* * Make a local copy of the attribute bitmap that can be modified. @@ -3617,7 +3620,6 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr4(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, args.contextsupport = false; #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL - args.context = NULL; if ((attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) || attrmask[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) { if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL) From ba7b6633e9afa6b5a788efd533c4bdc6fb1c606d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Sundar S K Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 15:23:56 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 02/19] platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix SMU command submission path on new AMD platform MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The commit 426463d94d45 ("platform/x86/amd/pmc: Send OS_HINT command for new AMD platform") was introduced to enable sending mailbox commands to PMFW on newer platforms. However, it was later discovered that the commit did not configure the correct message port ID (i.e., S2D or PMC). Without this configuration, all command submissions to PMFW are treated as invalid, leading to command failures. To address this issue, the CPU ID association for the new platform needs to be added in amd_pmc_get_ip_info(). This ensures that the correct SMU port IDs are selected. Fixes: 426463d94d45 ("platform/x86/amd/pmc: Send OS_HINT command for new AMD platform") Co-developed-by: Sanket Goswami Signed-off-by: Sanket Goswami Signed-off-by: Shyam Sundar S K Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822095357.395808-1-Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen --- drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c index c3e51f0a5c33..f0d389cf1ecb 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c @@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ static void amd_pmc_get_ip_info(struct amd_pmc_dev *dev) dev->smu_msg = 0x538; break; case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_ROOT: + case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_ROOT: dev->num_ips = 22; dev->s2d_msg_id = 0xDE; dev->smu_msg = 0x938; From a24cd5cfd1d07712a9f192401af638e3c6cc1491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shyam Sundar S K Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 15:23:57 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 03/19] platform/x86/amd/pmc: Extend support for PMC features on new AMD platform MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit PMC driver has capability to get the idle mask values and STB data from the PMFW. Extend this support to the platforms that belong to family 1Ah model 60h series. Co-developed-by: Sanket Goswami Signed-off-by: Sanket Goswami Signed-off-by: Shyam Sundar S K Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822095357.395808-2-Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen --- drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c index f0d389cf1ecb..bbb8edb62e00 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c @@ -598,6 +598,7 @@ static int amd_pmc_idlemask_read(struct amd_pmc_dev *pdev, struct device *dev, val = amd_pmc_reg_read(pdev, AMD_PMC_SCRATCH_REG_YC); break; case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_ROOT: + case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_ROOT: val = amd_pmc_reg_read(pdev, AMD_PMC_SCRATCH_REG_1AH); break; default: @@ -631,6 +632,7 @@ static bool amd_pmc_is_stb_supported(struct amd_pmc_dev *dev) case AMD_CPU_ID_CB: case AMD_CPU_ID_PS: case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_ROOT: + case PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_ROOT: return true; default: return false; From a204501e1743d695ca2930ed25a2be9f8ced96d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 11:51:08 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 04/19] nfsd: prevent panic for nfsv4.0 closed files in nfs4_show_open Prior to commit 3f29cc82a84c ("nfsd: split sc_status out of sc_type") states_show() relied on sc_type field to be of valid type before calling into a subfunction to show content of a particular stateid. From that commit, we split the validity of the stateid into sc_status and no longer changed sc_type to 0 while unhashing the stateid. This resulted in kernel oopsing for nfsv4.0 opens that stay around and in nfs4_show_open() would derefence sc_file which was NULL. Instead, for closed open stateids forgo displaying information that relies of having a valid sc_file. To reproduce: mount the server with 4.0, read and close a file and then on the server cat /proc/fs/nfsd/clients/2/states [ 513.590804] Call trace: [ 513.590925] _raw_spin_lock+0xcc/0x160 [ 513.591119] nfs4_show_open+0x78/0x2c0 [nfsd] [ 513.591412] states_show+0x44c/0x488 [nfsd] [ 513.591681] seq_read_iter+0x5d8/0x760 [ 513.591896] seq_read+0x188/0x208 [ 513.592075] vfs_read+0x148/0x470 [ 513.592241] ksys_read+0xcc/0x178 Fixes: 3f29cc82a84c ("nfsd: split sc_status out of sc_type") Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index a20c2c9d7d45..dafff707e23a 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2789,15 +2789,18 @@ static int nfs4_show_open(struct seq_file *s, struct nfs4_stid *st) deny & NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ ? "r" : "-", deny & NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE ? "w" : "-"); - spin_lock(&nf->fi_lock); - file = find_any_file_locked(nf); - if (file) { - nfs4_show_superblock(s, file); - seq_puts(s, ", "); - nfs4_show_fname(s, file); - seq_puts(s, ", "); - } - spin_unlock(&nf->fi_lock); + if (nf) { + spin_lock(&nf->fi_lock); + file = find_any_file_locked(nf); + if (file) { + nfs4_show_superblock(s, file); + seq_puts(s, ", "); + nfs4_show_fname(s, file); + seq_puts(s, ", "); + } + spin_unlock(&nf->fi_lock); + } else + seq_puts(s, "closed, "); nfs4_show_owner(s, oo); if (st->sc_status & SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED) seq_puts(s, ", admin-revoked"); From 58aec91efb93338d1cc7acc0a93242613a2a4e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miao Wang Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2024 22:17:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/19] LoongArch: Remove the unused dma-direct.h dma-direct.h is introduced in commit d4b6f1562a3c3284 ("LoongArch: Add Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) support"). In commit c78c43fe7d42524c ("LoongArch: Use acpi_arch_dma_setup() and remove ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA"), ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA was deselected and the coresponding phys_to_dma()/ dma_to_phys() functions were removed. However, the unused dma-direct.h was left behind, which is removed by this patch. Cc: Fixes: c78c43fe7d42 ("LoongArch: Use acpi_arch_dma_setup() and remove ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA") Signed-off-by: Miao Wang Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/dma-direct.h | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/loongarch/include/asm/dma-direct.h diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/dma-direct.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/dma-direct.h deleted file mode 100644 index 75ccd808a2af..000000000000 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/dma-direct.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2020-2022 Loongson Technology Corporation Limited - */ -#ifndef _LOONGARCH_DMA_DIRECT_H -#define _LOONGARCH_DMA_DIRECT_H - -dma_addr_t phys_to_dma(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr); -phys_addr_t dma_to_phys(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t daddr); - -#endif /* _LOONGARCH_DMA_DIRECT_H */ From 2d3447261031503b181dacc549fe65ffe2d93d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 15:53:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 06/19] btrfs: run delayed iputs when flushing delalloc We have transient failures with btrfs/301, specifically in the part where we do for i in $(seq 0 10); do write 50m to file rm -f file done Sometimes this will result in a transient quota error, and it's because sometimes we start writeback on the file which results in a delayed iput, and thus the rm doesn't actually clean the file up. When we're flushing the quota space we need to run the delayed iputs to make sure all the unlinks that we think have completed have actually completed. This removes the small window where we could fail to find enough space in our quota. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c index 5d57a285d59b..7d6f5d9420ec 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c @@ -4185,6 +4185,8 @@ static int try_flush_qgroup(struct btrfs_root *root) return 0; } + btrfs_run_delayed_iputs(root->fs_info); + btrfs_wait_on_delayed_iputs(root->fs_info); ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(root, true); if (ret < 0) goto out; From 28f5df210d06beb5920cf80446f1c27456c14b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yann Droneaud Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2024 16:47:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/19] random: vDSO: reject unknown getrandom() flags Like the getrandom() syscall, vDSO getrandom() must also reject unknown flags. [1] It would be possible to return -EINVAL from vDSO itself, but in the possible case that a new flag is added to getrandom() syscall in the future, it would be easier to get the behavior from the syscall, instead of erroring until the vDSO is extended to support the new flag or explicitly falling back. [1] Designing the API: Planning for Extension https://docs.kernel.org/process/adding-syscalls.html#designing-the-api-planning-for-extension Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud [Jason: reworded commit message] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/vdso/getrandom.c b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c index b230f0b10832..e1db228bc4f0 100644 --- a/lib/vdso/getrandom.c +++ b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c @@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ __cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_ if (unlikely(((unsigned long)opaque_state & ~PAGE_MASK) + sizeof(*state) > PAGE_SIZE)) return -EFAULT; + /* Handle unexpected flags by falling back to the kernel. */ + if (unlikely(flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))) + goto fallback_syscall; + /* If the caller passes the wrong size, which might happen due to CRIU, fallback. */ if (unlikely(opaque_len != sizeof(*state))) goto fallback_syscall; From 9286dfd5735b9cceb6a14bdf15e13400ccb60fe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Fenniak Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 15:56:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/19] platform/x86: asus-wmi: Fix spurious rfkill on UX8406MA MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The Asus Zenbook Duo (UX8406MA) has a keyboard which can be placed on the laptop to connect it via USB, or can be removed from the laptop to reveal a hidden secondary display in which case the keyboard operates via Bluetooth. When it is placed on the secondary display to connect via USB, it emits a keypress for a wireless disable. This causes the rfkill system to be activated disconnecting the current wifi connection, which doesn't reflect the user's true intention. Detect this hardware and suppress any wireless switches from the keyboard; this keyboard does not have a wireless toggle capability so these presses are always spurious. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Fenniak Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240823135630.128447-1-mathieu@fenniak.net Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen --- drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c index fceffe2082ec..ed3633c5955d 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static struct quirk_entry quirk_asus_ignore_fan = { .wmi_ignore_fan = true, }; +static struct quirk_entry quirk_asus_zenbook_duo_kbd = { + .ignore_key_wlan = true, +}; + static int dmi_matched(const struct dmi_system_id *dmi) { pr_info("Identified laptop model '%s'\n", dmi->ident); @@ -516,6 +520,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id asus_quirks[] = { }, .driver_data = &quirk_asus_ignore_fan, }, + { + .callback = dmi_matched, + .ident = "ASUS Zenbook Duo UX8406MA", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "UX8406MA"), + }, + .driver_data = &quirk_asus_zenbook_duo_kbd, + }, {}, }; @@ -630,7 +643,12 @@ static void asus_nb_wmi_key_filter(struct asus_wmi_driver *asus_wmi, int *code, case 0x32: /* Volume Mute */ if (atkbd_reports_vol_keys) *code = ASUS_WMI_KEY_IGNORE; - + break; + case 0x5D: /* Wireless console Toggle */ + case 0x5E: /* Wireless console Enable */ + case 0x5F: /* Wireless console Disable */ + if (quirks->ignore_key_wlan) + *code = ASUS_WMI_KEY_IGNORE; break; } } diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.h b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.h index cc30f1853847..d02f15fd3482 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.h +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct quirk_entry { bool wmi_force_als_set; bool wmi_ignore_fan; bool filter_i8042_e1_extended_codes; + bool ignore_key_wlan; enum asus_wmi_tablet_switch_mode tablet_switch_mode; int wapf; /* From a3379eca24a7da5118a7d090da6f8eb8611acac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2024 15:24:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/19] platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: Make Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 X90F DMI match less strict MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit There are 2G and 4G RAM versions of the Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 X90F and it turns out that the 2G version has a DMI product name of "CHERRYVIEW D1 PLATFORM" where as the 4G version has "CHERRYVIEW C0 PLATFORM". The sys-vendor + product-version check are unique enough that the product-name check is not necessary. Drop the product-name check so that the existing DMI match for the 4G RAM version also matches the 2G RAM version. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240825132415.8307-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen --- drivers/platform/x86/x86-android-tablets/dmi.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/x86-android-tablets/dmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/x86-android-tablets/dmi.c index 141a2d25e83b..387dd092c4dd 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/x86-android-tablets/dmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/x86-android-tablets/dmi.c @@ -140,7 +140,6 @@ const struct dmi_system_id x86_android_tablet_ids[] __initconst = { /* Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 Pro YT3-X90F */ .matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "CHERRYVIEW D1 PLATFORM"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "Blade3-10A-001"), }, .driver_data = (void *)&lenovo_yt3_info, From 33f58a0480bb9e2479ccdf556f61363723a50d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Sterba Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 01:19:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/19] btrfs: initialize last_extent_end to fix -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning in extent_fiemap() There's a warning (probably on some older compiler version): fs/btrfs/fiemap.c: warning: 'last_extent_end' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]: => 822:19 Initialize the variable to 0 although it's not necessary as it's either properly set or not used after an error. The called function is in the same file so this is a false alert but we want to fix all -Wmaybe-uninitialized reports. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240819070639.2558629-1-geert@linux-m68k.org/ Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/fiemap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/fiemap.c b/fs/btrfs/fiemap.c index 8f95f3e44e99..df7f09f3b02e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/fiemap.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/fiemap.c @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ static int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct btrfs_path *path; struct fiemap_cache cache = { 0 }; struct btrfs_backref_share_check_ctx *backref_ctx; - u64 last_extent_end; + u64 last_extent_end = 0; u64 prev_extent_end; u64 range_start; u64 range_end; From 274ea3563e5ab9f468c15bfb9d2492803a66d9be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 23:11:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/19] LoongArch: Define ARCH_IRQ_INIT_FLAGS as IRQ_NOPROBE Currently we call irq_set_noprobe() in a loop for all IRQs, but indeed it only works for IRQs below NR_IRQS_LEGACY because at init_IRQ() only legacy interrupts have been allocated. Instead, we can define ARCH_IRQ_INIT_FLAGS as IRQ_NOPROBE in asm/hwirq.h and the core will automatically set the flag for all interrupts. Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Tianyang Zhang --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/hw_irq.h | 2 ++ arch/loongarch/kernel/irq.c | 3 --- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/hw_irq.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/hw_irq.h index af4f4e8fbd85..8156ffb67415 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/hw_irq.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/hw_irq.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ extern atomic_t irq_err_count; +#define ARCH_IRQ_INIT_FLAGS IRQ_NOPROBE + /* * interrupt-retrigger: NOP for now. This may not be appropriate for all * machines, we'll see ... diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/irq.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/irq.c index f4991c03514f..adac8fcbb2ac 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/irq.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/irq.c @@ -102,9 +102,6 @@ void __init init_IRQ(void) mp_ops.init_ipi(); #endif - for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++) - irq_set_noprobe(i); - for_each_possible_cpu(i) { page = alloc_pages_node(cpu_to_node(i), GFP_KERNEL, order); From 80376323e2b6a4559f86b2b4d864848ac25cb054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiezhu Yang Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 23:11:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 12/19] LoongArch: Add ifdefs to fix LSX and LASX related warnings There exist some warnings when building kernel if CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT is set but CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LSX and CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LASX are not set. In this case, there are no definitions of _restore_lsx & _restore_lasx and there are also no definitions of kvm_restore_lsx & kvm_restore_lasx in fpu.S and switch.S respectively, just add some ifdefs to fix these warnings. AS arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.o arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.o: warning: objtool: unexpected relocation symbol type in .rela.discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard: 0 arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.o: warning: objtool: unexpected relocation symbol type in .rela.discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard: 0 AS [M] arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.o arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.o: warning: objtool: unexpected relocation symbol type in .rela.discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard: 0 arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.o: warning: objtool: unexpected relocation symbol type in .rela.discard.func_stack_frame_non_standard: 0 MODPOST Module.symvers ERROR: modpost: "kvm_restore_lsx" [arch/loongarch/kvm/kvm.ko] undefined! ERROR: modpost: "kvm_restore_lasx" [arch/loongarch/kvm/kvm.ko] undefined! Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+ Fixes: cb8a2ef0848c ("LoongArch: Add ORC stack unwinder support") Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408120955.qls5oNQY-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S | 4 ++++ arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.S | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S b/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S index 69a85f2479fb..6ab640101457 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/fpu.S @@ -530,6 +530,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_lasx_context) #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD _restore_fp +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LSX STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD _restore_lsx +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LASX STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD _restore_lasx #endif +#endif diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.S b/arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.S index 80e988985a6a..0c292f818492 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.S +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/switch.S @@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ SYM_DATA(kvm_enter_guest_size, .quad kvm_enter_guest_end - kvm_enter_guest) #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD kvm_restore_fpu +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LSX STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD kvm_restore_lsx +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LASX STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD kvm_restore_lasx #endif +#endif From 4956e07f05e239b274d042618a250c9fa3e92629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bibo Mao Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 23:11:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 13/19] LoongArch: KVM: Invalidate guest steal time address on vCPU reset If ParaVirt steal time feature is enabled, there is a percpu gpa address passed from guest vCPU and host modifies guest memory space with this gpa address. When vCPU is reset normally, it will notify host and invalidate gpa address. However if VM is crashed and VMM reboots VM forcely, the vCPU reboot notification callback will not be called in VM. Host needs invalidate the gpa address, else host will modify guest memory during VM reboots. Here it is invalidated from the vCPU KVM_REG_LOONGARCH_VCPU_RESET ioctl interface. Also funciton kvm_reset_timer() is removed at vCPU reset stage, since SW emulated timer is only used in vCPU block state. When a vCPU is removed from the block waiting queue, kvm_restore_timer() is called and SW timer is cancelled. And the timer register is also cleared at VMM when a vCPU is reset. Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_vcpu.h | 1 - arch/loongarch/kvm/timer.c | 7 ------- arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_vcpu.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_vcpu.h index c416cb7125c0..86570084e05a 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_vcpu.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_vcpu.h @@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ static inline void kvm_restore_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu) { } #endif void kvm_init_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hz); -void kvm_reset_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_save_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_restore_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/timer.c b/arch/loongarch/kvm/timer.c index bcc6b6d063d9..74a4b5c272d6 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/timer.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/timer.c @@ -188,10 +188,3 @@ void kvm_save_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_save_hw_gcsr(csr, LOONGARCH_CSR_ESTAT); preempt_enable(); } - -void kvm_reset_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - write_gcsr_timercfg(0); - kvm_write_sw_gcsr(vcpu->arch.csr, LOONGARCH_CSR_TCFG, 0); - hrtimer_cancel(&vcpu->arch.swtimer); -} diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c b/arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c index 16756ffb55e8..6905283f535b 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static int kvm_set_one_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vcpu->kvm->arch.time_offset = (signed long)(v - drdtime()); break; case KVM_REG_LOONGARCH_VCPU_RESET: - kvm_reset_timer(vcpu); + vcpu->arch.st.guest_addr = 0; memset(&vcpu->arch.irq_pending, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.irq_pending)); memset(&vcpu->arch.irq_clear, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.irq_clear)); break; From f25d1b5f1be13a6de341b1d26e0cf4275e5908d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2024 11:33:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 14/19] MAINTAINERS: Update Olga Kornievskaia's email address Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 93238316b6c0..174d65623a8b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -11974,7 +11974,7 @@ KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERS M: Chuck Lever M: Jeff Layton R: Neil Brown -R: Olga Kornievskaia +R: Olga Kornievskaia R: Dai Ngo R: Tom Talpey L: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org From da05ba23d4c8d3e8a45846b952e53dd76c4b5e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 18:27:38 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 15/19] nfsd: hold reference to delegation when updating it for cb_getattr Once we've dropped the flc_lock, there is nothing that ensures that the delegation that was found will still be around later. Take a reference to it while holding the lock and then drop it when we've finished with the delegation. Fixes: c5967721e106 ("NFSD: handle GETATTR conflict with write delegation") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index dafff707e23a..19d39872be32 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -8837,7 +8837,6 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id); struct file_lock_context *ctx; struct file_lease *fl; - struct nfs4_delegation *dp; struct iattr attrs; struct nfs4_cb_fattr *ncf; @@ -8862,7 +8861,8 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, goto break_lease; } if (type == F_WRLCK) { - dp = fl->c.flc_owner; + struct nfs4_delegation *dp = fl->c.flc_owner; + if (dp->dl_recall.cb_clp == *(rqstp->rq_lease_breaker)) { spin_unlock(&ctx->flc_lock); return 0; @@ -8870,6 +8870,7 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, break_lease: nfsd_stats_wdeleg_getattr_inc(nn); dp = fl->c.flc_owner; + refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count); ncf = &dp->dl_cb_fattr; nfs4_cb_getattr(&dp->dl_cb_fattr); spin_unlock(&ctx->flc_lock); @@ -8879,8 +8880,10 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, /* Recall delegation only if client didn't respond */ status = nfserrno(nfsd_open_break_lease(inode, NFSD_MAY_READ)); if (status != nfserr_jukebox || - !nfsd_wait_for_delegreturn(rqstp, inode)) + !nfsd_wait_for_delegreturn(rqstp, inode)) { + nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); return status; + } } if (!ncf->ncf_file_modified && (ncf->ncf_initial_cinfo != ncf->ncf_cb_change || @@ -8900,6 +8903,7 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, *size = ncf->ncf_cur_fsize; *modified = true; } + nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); return 0; } break; From 1116e0e372eb16dd907ec571ce5d4af325c55c10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 18:27:39 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 16/19] nfsd: fix potential UAF in nfsd4_cb_getattr_release Once we drop the delegation reference, the fields embedded in it are no longer safe to access. Do that last. Fixes: c5967721e106 ("NFSD: handle GETATTR conflict with write delegation") Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 19d39872be32..02d43f95146e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -3078,9 +3078,9 @@ nfsd4_cb_getattr_release(struct nfsd4_callback *cb) struct nfs4_delegation *dp = container_of(ncf, struct nfs4_delegation, dl_cb_fattr); - nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); clear_bit(CB_GETATTR_BUSY, &ncf->ncf_cb_flags); wake_up_bit(&ncf->ncf_cb_flags, CB_GETATTR_BUSY); + nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); } static const struct nfsd4_callback_ops nfsd4_cb_recall_any_ops = { From 7e8ae8486e4471513e2111aba6ac29f2357bed2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 10:32:34 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/19] fs/nfsd: fix update of inode attrs in CB_GETATTR Currently, we copy the mtime and ctime to the in-core inode and then mark the inode dirty. This is fine for certain types of filesystems, but not all. Some require a real setattr to properly change these values (e.g. ceph or reexported NFS). Fix this code to call notify_change() instead, which is the proper way to effect a setattr. There is one problem though: In this case, the client is holding a write delegation and has sent us attributes to update our cache. We don't want to break the delegation for this since that would defeat the purpose. Add a new ATTR_DELEG flag that makes notify_change bypass the try_break_deleg call. Fixes: c5967721e106 ("NFSD: handle GETATTR conflict with write delegation") Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/attr.c | 14 +++++++++++--- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +- fs/nfsd/state.h | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 960a310581eb..0dbf43b6555c 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -489,9 +489,17 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, error = security_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); if (error) return error; - error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); - if (error) - return error; + + /* + * If ATTR_DELEG is set, then these attributes are being set on + * behalf of the holder of a write delegation. We want to avoid + * breaking the delegation in this case. + */ + if (!(ia_valid & ATTR_DELEG)) { + error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); + if (error) + return error; + } if (inode->i_op->setattr) error = inode->i_op->setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 02d43f95146e..07f2496850c4 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -8815,7 +8815,7 @@ nfsd4_get_writestateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, /** * nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict - Recall if GETATTR causes conflict * @rqstp: RPC transaction context - * @inode: file to be checked for a conflict + * @dentry: dentry of inode to be checked for a conflict * @modified: return true if file was modified * @size: new size of file if modified is true * @@ -8830,7 +8830,7 @@ nfsd4_get_writestateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, * code is returned. */ __be32 -nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, +nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry, bool *modified, u64 *size) { __be32 status; @@ -8839,6 +8839,7 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, struct file_lease *fl; struct iattr attrs; struct nfs4_cb_fattr *ncf; + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); *modified = false; ctx = locks_inode_context(inode); @@ -8890,15 +8891,22 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct inode *inode, ncf->ncf_cur_fsize != ncf->ncf_cb_fsize)) ncf->ncf_file_modified = true; if (ncf->ncf_file_modified) { + int err; + /* * Per section 10.4.3 of RFC 8881, the server would * not update the file's metadata with the client's * modified size */ attrs.ia_mtime = attrs.ia_ctime = current_time(inode); - attrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME; - setattr_copy(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, &attrs); - mark_inode_dirty(inode); + attrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_DELEG; + inode_lock(inode); + err = notify_change(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &attrs, NULL); + inode_unlock(inode); + if (err) { + nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); + return nfserrno(err); + } ncf->ncf_cur_fsize = ncf->ncf_cb_fsize; *size = ncf->ncf_cur_fsize; *modified = true; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 43ccf6119cf1..97f583777972 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3565,7 +3565,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr4(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, } args.size = 0; if (attrmask[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_CHANGE | FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE)) { - status = nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(rqstp, d_inode(dentry), + status = nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(rqstp, dentry, &file_modified, &size); if (status) goto out; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/state.h b/fs/nfsd/state.h index ffc217099d19..ec4559ecd193 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/state.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h @@ -781,5 +781,5 @@ static inline bool try_to_expire_client(struct nfs4_client *clp) } extern __be32 nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, - struct inode *inode, bool *file_modified, u64 *size); + struct dentry *dentry, bool *file_modified, u64 *size); #endif /* NFSD4_STATE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 0283cf366c2a..bafc1d134b94 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ typedef int (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset, #define ATTR_OPEN (1 << 15) /* Truncating from open(O_TRUNC) */ #define ATTR_TIMES_SET (1 << 16) #define ATTR_TOUCH (1 << 17) +#define ATTR_DELEG (1 << 18) /* Delegated attrs. Don't break write delegations */ /* * Whiteout is represented by a char device. The following constants define the From 10d9d8c3512f16cad47b2ff81ec6fc4b27d8ee10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2024 18:34:30 +0930 Subject: [PATCH 18/19] btrfs: fix a use-after-free when hitting errors inside btrfs_submit_chunk() [BUG] There is an internal report that KASAN is reporting use-after-free, with the following backtrace: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_check_read_bio+0xa68/0xb70 [btrfs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881117cec28 by task kworker/u16:2/45 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-next-20240805-default+ #76 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5e/0x2f0 print_report+0x118/0x216 kasan_report+0x11d/0x1f0 btrfs_check_read_bio+0xa68/0xb70 [btrfs] process_one_work+0xce0/0x12a0 worker_thread+0x717/0x1250 kthread+0x2e3/0x3c0 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 Allocated by task 20917: kasan_save_stack+0x37/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x7d/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x16e/0x3e0 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x12e/0x310 bio_alloc_bioset+0x3f0/0x7a0 btrfs_bio_alloc+0x2e/0x50 [btrfs] submit_extent_page+0x4d1/0xdb0 [btrfs] btrfs_do_readpage+0x8b4/0x12a0 [btrfs] btrfs_readahead+0x29a/0x430 [btrfs] read_pages+0x1a7/0xc60 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x2ad/0x560 filemap_get_pages+0x629/0xa20 filemap_read+0x335/0xbf0 vfs_read+0x790/0xcb0 ksys_read+0xfd/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Freed by task 20917: kasan_save_stack+0x37/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x60 kmem_cache_free+0x214/0x5d0 bio_free+0xed/0x180 end_bbio_data_read+0x1cc/0x580 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x98d/0x1880 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bio+0x33/0x70 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0xd4/0x130 [btrfs] submit_extent_page+0x3ea/0xdb0 [btrfs] btrfs_do_readpage+0x8b4/0x12a0 [btrfs] btrfs_readahead+0x29a/0x430 [btrfs] read_pages+0x1a7/0xc60 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x2ad/0x560 filemap_get_pages+0x629/0xa20 filemap_read+0x335/0xbf0 vfs_read+0x790/0xcb0 ksys_read+0xfd/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [CAUSE] Although I cannot reproduce the error, the report itself is good enough to pin down the cause. The call trace is the regular endio workqueue context, but the free-by-task trace is showing that during btrfs_submit_chunk() we already hit a critical error, and is calling btrfs_bio_end_io() to error out. And the original endio function called bio_put() to free the whole bio. This means a double freeing thus causing use-after-free, e.g.: 1. Enter btrfs_submit_bio() with a read bio The read bio length is 128K, crossing two 64K stripes. 2. The first run of btrfs_submit_chunk() 2.1 Call btrfs_map_block(), which returns 64K 2.2 Call btrfs_split_bio() Now there are two bios, one referring to the first 64K, the other referring to the second 64K. 2.3 The first half is submitted. 3. The second run of btrfs_submit_chunk() 3.1 Call btrfs_map_block(), which by somehow failed Now we call btrfs_bio_end_io() to handle the error 3.2 btrfs_bio_end_io() calls the original endio function Which is end_bbio_data_read(), and it calls bio_put() for the original bio. Now the original bio is freed. 4. The submitted first 64K bio finished Now we call into btrfs_check_read_bio() and tries to advance the bio iter. But since the original bio (thus its iter) is already freed, we trigger the above use-after free. And even if the memory is not poisoned/corrupted, we will later call the original endio function, causing a double freeing. [FIX] Instead of calling btrfs_bio_end_io(), call btrfs_orig_bbio_end_io(), which has the extra check on split bios and do the proper refcounting for cloned bios. Furthermore there is already one extra btrfs_cleanup_bio() call, but that is duplicated to btrfs_orig_bbio_end_io() call, so remove that label completely. Reported-by: David Sterba Fixes: 852eee62d31a ("btrfs: allow btrfs_submit_bio to split bios") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/bio.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/bio.c b/fs/btrfs/bio.c index f04d93109960..b4e31ae17cd9 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/bio.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/bio.c @@ -668,7 +668,6 @@ static bool btrfs_submit_chunk(struct btrfs_bio *bbio, int mirror_num) { struct btrfs_inode *inode = bbio->inode; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = bbio->fs_info; - struct btrfs_bio *orig_bbio = bbio; struct bio *bio = &bbio->bio; u64 logical = bio->bi_iter.bi_sector << SECTOR_SHIFT; u64 length = bio->bi_iter.bi_size; @@ -706,7 +705,7 @@ static bool btrfs_submit_chunk(struct btrfs_bio *bbio, int mirror_num) bbio->saved_iter = bio->bi_iter; ret = btrfs_lookup_bio_sums(bbio); if (ret) - goto fail_put_bio; + goto fail; } if (btrfs_op(bio) == BTRFS_MAP_WRITE) { @@ -740,13 +739,13 @@ static bool btrfs_submit_chunk(struct btrfs_bio *bbio, int mirror_num) ret = btrfs_bio_csum(bbio); if (ret) - goto fail_put_bio; + goto fail; } else if (use_append || (btrfs_is_zoned(fs_info) && inode && inode->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM)) { ret = btrfs_alloc_dummy_sum(bbio); if (ret) - goto fail_put_bio; + goto fail; } } @@ -754,12 +753,23 @@ static bool btrfs_submit_chunk(struct btrfs_bio *bbio, int mirror_num) done: return map_length == length; -fail_put_bio: - if (map_length < length) - btrfs_cleanup_bio(bbio); fail: btrfs_bio_counter_dec(fs_info); - btrfs_bio_end_io(orig_bbio, ret); + /* + * We have split the original bbio, now we have to end both the current + * @bbio and remaining one, as the remaining one will never be submitted. + */ + if (map_length < length) { + struct btrfs_bio *remaining = bbio->private; + + ASSERT(bbio->bio.bi_pool == &btrfs_clone_bioset); + ASSERT(remaining); + + remaining->bio.bi_status = ret; + btrfs_orig_bbio_end_io(remaining); + } + bbio->bio.bi_status = ret; + btrfs_orig_bbio_end_io(bbio); /* Do not submit another chunk */ return true; } From ecb54277cb63c273e8d74272e5b9bfd80c2185d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 11:30:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 19/19] btrfs: fix uninitialized return value from btrfs_reclaim_sweep() The return variable 'ret' at btrfs_reclaim_sweep() is never assigned if none of the space infos is reclaimable (for example if periodic reclaim is disabled, which is the default), so we return an undefined value. This can be fixed my making btrfs_reclaim_sweep() not return any value as well as do_reclaim_sweep() because: 1) do_reclaim_sweep() always returns 0, so we can make it return void; 2) The only caller of btrfs_reclaim_sweep() (btrfs_reclaim_bgs()) doesn't care about its return value, and in its context there's nothing to do about any errors anyway. Therefore remove the return value from btrfs_reclaim_sweep() and do_reclaim_sweep(). Fixes: e4ca3932ae90 ("btrfs: periodic block_group reclaim") Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba --- fs/btrfs/space-info.c | 17 +++++------------ fs/btrfs/space-info.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c index 68e14fd48638..c691784b4660 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/space-info.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/space-info.c @@ -1985,8 +1985,8 @@ static bool is_reclaim_urgent(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info) return unalloc < data_chunk_size; } -static int do_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, - struct btrfs_space_info *space_info, int raid) +static void do_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, + struct btrfs_space_info *space_info, int raid) { struct btrfs_block_group *bg; int thresh_pct; @@ -2031,7 +2031,6 @@ static int do_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, } up_read(&space_info->groups_sem); - return 0; } void btrfs_space_info_update_reclaimable(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info, s64 bytes) @@ -2074,21 +2073,15 @@ bool btrfs_should_periodic_reclaim(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info) return ret; } -int btrfs_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +void btrfs_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) { - int ret; int raid; struct btrfs_space_info *space_info; list_for_each_entry(space_info, &fs_info->space_info, list) { if (!btrfs_should_periodic_reclaim(space_info)) continue; - for (raid = 0; raid < BTRFS_NR_RAID_TYPES; raid++) { - ret = do_reclaim_sweep(fs_info, space_info, raid); - if (ret) - return ret; - } + for (raid = 0; raid < BTRFS_NR_RAID_TYPES; raid++) + do_reclaim_sweep(fs_info, space_info, raid); } - - return ret; } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/space-info.h b/fs/btrfs/space-info.h index 88b44221ce97..5602026c5e14 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/space-info.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/space-info.h @@ -294,6 +294,6 @@ void btrfs_space_info_update_reclaimable(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info, s6 void btrfs_set_periodic_reclaim_ready(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info, bool ready); bool btrfs_should_periodic_reclaim(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info); int btrfs_calc_reclaim_threshold(struct btrfs_space_info *space_info); -int btrfs_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info); +void btrfs_reclaim_sweep(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info); #endif /* BTRFS_SPACE_INFO_H */